Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mathematical Methods in Philosophy', 'Things' and 'Elusive Knowledge'

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15 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 9. Philosophical Logic
18739 Three stages of philosophical logic: syntactic (1905-55), possible worlds (1963-85), widening (1990-) [Horsten/Pettigrew]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
18741 Logical formalization makes concepts precise, and also shows their interrelation [Horsten/Pettigrew]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
18744 Models are sets with functions and relations, and truth built up from the components [Horsten/Pettigrew]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
18740 If 'exist' doesn't express a property, we can hardly ask for its essence [Horsten/Pettigrew]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
7783 Bodies, properties, relations, events, numbers, sets and propositions are 'things' if they exist [Lowe]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
18745 A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs [Horsten/Pettigrew]
18747 The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals [Horsten/Pettigrew]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
18748 Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds [Horsten/Pettigrew]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
18746 Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment [Horsten/Pettigrew]
18750 Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far [Horsten/Pettigrew]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
12899 The timid student has knowledge without belief, lacking confidence in their correct answer [Lewis]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
12897 To say S knows P, but cannot eliminate not-P, sounds like a contradiction [Lewis]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
12898 Justification is neither sufficient nor necessary for knowledge [Lewis]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
12895 Knowing is context-sensitive because the domain of quantification varies [Lewis, by Cohen,S]
19562 We have knowledge if alternatives are eliminated, but appropriate alternatives depend on context [Lewis, by Cohen,S]